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Cassandra Burke Robertson∗ 
In Medellín v. Texas, the Supreme Court went out of its 
way to disavow any intent to bring its analysis into the realm of 
civil litigation. This Article, prepared for the Frederick K. Cox 
International Law Center Symposium “Presidential Power, 
Foreign Affairs, & the 2012 Election,” argues that in spite of 
the Court’s stated intent, there is reason to believe that the 
policies animating Medellín may nonetheless bleed into 
transnational civil litigation. Medellín represents a noteworthy 
shift in the process of international lawmaking; it moves away 
from a traditional process and de-emphasizes executive power at 
the federal level. In theory, it allows greater legislative and state 
participation in the international realm. For private 
international law—and especially for matters of forum selection 
and judgment enforcement—this participation is likely to mean 
politicization. By leaving an opening for further politicization of 
international law, the Court’s opinion in Medellín moves the 
United States further away from being able to implement a 
coherent court-access policy. 
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín v. Texas, which held 
that that a decision of the International Court of Justice would not 
pre-empt state limitations on the filing of successive habeas petitions,1 
can be read as a death-penalty case,2 as a federalism case,3 or as an 
international human-rights case.4 By no stretch of the imagination is 
∗ Associate Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. 
This article was prepared for the Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law panel, “The President’s Power to Implement 
International Law After Medellín v. Texas,” as part of the symposium 
“Presidential Power, Foreign Affairs & the 2012 Election.” 
1. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 498–99 (2008). 
2. See Christina M. Cerna, The Right to Consular Notification as a 
Human Right, 31 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 419, 438 (2008) (noting 
that the consular-notification issue arose “in the context of the frontal 
attack launched by Europe and Latin America against the continued 
imposition of the death penalty by the United States”). 
3. See Ted Cruz, Defending U.S. Sovereignty, Separation of Powers, and 
Federalism in Medellín v. Texas, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 25, 35 
(2010) (“Medellín was a significant victory for U.S. sovereignty, for 
separation of powers, and for federalism.”). 
4. See Margaret E. McGuinness, Three Narratives of Medellín v. Texas, 31 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 227, 246 (2008) (“The enduring legacy of 
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it a case about ordinary civil litigation. It seems almost incongruous, 
then, that the majority opinion would go out of its way to disavow 
any intent to bring its analysis into the realm of civil litigation. But 
the Court does exactly that, asserting that its “holding does not call 
into question the ordinary enforcement of foreign judgments or 
international arbitral agreements.”5 This very disavowal reveals an 
underlying concern that the policies animating Medellín may indeed 
bleed into transnational civil litigation.6 Nor is this concern 
unwarranted: although the Court is correct that Medellín does not 
directly affect ordinary judgment enforcement, the Court’s opinion 
increases the risk that domestic politics will influence transnational 
judgment enforcement in ways that harm the nation’s foreign policy 
interests, and ultimately, its economic interests as well.7 
There is no doubt that questions of court access and foreign 
judgment enforcement implicate both foreign policy and economic 
vitality.8 Professor Stephen Burbank has described how the 
“geopolitical ramifications of international commerce” interact with 
the domestic judicial system.9 Over the last three decades, the United 
States has struggled with its role in transnational litigation. The 
availability of higher damage awards, liberal discovery, and accessible 
courts made United States courts an attractive destination for foreign 
plaintiffs, though it has made the United States much less attractive 
Medellín II may thus be the unflattering and unmoving image of 
American human rights exceptionalism, reflected back at states eager to 
use U.S. non-compliance with international norms as an example and 
excuse for rolling back rights protection.”). 
5. Medellín, 552 U.S. at 519–20. 
6. See James M. Fischer, Discretion and Politics: Ruminations on the 
Recent Presidential Election and the Role of Discretion in the Florida 
Presidential Election Recount, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 807, 846 n.139 (2001) 
(noting that “[l]ike the Shakespearean lady who ‘doth protest too 
much,’” such statements may unintentionally reveal “the exactly 
opposite internal reality”). 
7. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Sabria McElroy & Sara Aronchick Solow, 
International Law at Home: Enforcing Treaties in U.S. Courts, 37 YALE 
J. INT’L L. 51, 73 (2012) (“Medellín has also led lower courts to apply 
the presumption against enforcement universally, apparently eliminating 
the carve-out for private law treaties that persisted through the postwar 
period up until Medellín.”). 
8. See Stephen B. Burbank, A Tea Party at the Hague?, 18 SW. J. INT’L 
LAW 629 (2012) (“Transnational judgment recognition and enforcement 
law and practice are, inescapably, aspects of a country’s foreign 
policy.”). 
9. See id. at 637–38 (discussing the impact of the American private bar on 
U.S. policy during international negotiations).  
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for foreign defendants.10 The centrality of the United States’ role in 
transnational litigation is now shrinking, however, as both commerce 
and commercial litigation are entering a more multipolar era.11  
As parties perceive greater freedom in choosing a destination for 
transnational lawsuits, the foreign policy of court access becomes ever 
more important. If the United States is viewed as an uncooperative 
judicial partner, nations may retaliate by enacting legislation that 
either encourages litigation against U.S. companies or discourages 
investment and trade by those companies—both scenarios would 
harm U.S. economic interests abroad.12 Likewise, unilaterally generous 
judgment enforcement policies may make it more difficult to negotiate 
a multilateral judgment enforcement convention,13 but more 
restrictive policies run the risk of a worldwide search for corporate 
assets in a potentially more favorable forum.14 
Medellín—even though it is ostensibly so far removed from civil 
litigation practice—moves the domestic discourse away from a 
coherent court-access policy. By requiring what amounts to a “clear 
statement rule” for self-executing treaties, the Court makes it 
marginally more difficult to negotiate a judgments convention, to 
implement the Choice of Court convention, or to engage in other 
10. See id. at 630 (referring to the United States as “a country whose courts 
have been called the light to which prospective foreign plaintiffs are 
drawn like moths, and are a light that most prospective foreign 
defendants would like to turn out”); see also Cassandra Burke 
Robertson, Transnational Litigation and Institutional Choice, 51 B.C. L. 
REV. 1081, 1127 (2010) (noting “the increasing recognition that the 
court-access doctrine implicates U.S. foreign interests”). 
11. See Marcus S. Quintanilla & Christopher A. Whytock, The New 
Multipolarity in Transnational Litigation: Foreign Courts, Foreign 
Judgments, and Foreign Law, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 31, 48 (2011) (“[A]s we 
move toward 2021, transnational litigation will be increasingly 
multipolar.”); Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Impact of Third-Party 
Financing on Transnational Litigation, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 159, 
173 (2011) (“[T]here may well be a global diffusion of transnational 
cases, with courts in a much larger number of countries regularly 
hearing cases involving foreign parties.”). 
12. See Robertson, supra note 10, at 1111 (noting that “such a state will 
instead enact a more targeted blocking statute, or perhaps allow U.S.-
level damages in cases dismissed from U.S. courts”). 
13. See Burbank, supra note 8, at 633 (discussing how unilateralism 
hindered international cooperation). 
14. Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non 
Conveniens and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1444, 1464 (2011) (“[I]n order to obtain an effective remedy, a 
plaintiff must rely on enforcement by a court that does have jurisdiction 
over assets of the defendant.”). 
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private international law negotiations.15 Congress could, of course, 
pass the necessary enabling legislation. However, there are 
institutional competence factors that make Congress’s participation in 
the area less likely to occur: Congress lacks both the specialized 
knowledge and the political will to focus on the details of litigation 
procedure.16  
The larger impact of Medellín, however, may be how its role in 
domestic politics influences transnational lawmaking more broadly. 
The majority’s opinion recognizes that states can exert power even in 
areas that directly affect foreign policy. As Professor Ronald Brand 
has pointed out, because the opinion “hold[s] that state procedural 
rules could prevent the application of the binding international-law 
rules created by these treaties,” it may therefore “constitute an 
extraordinary delegation of authority to the states for matters of 
foreign affairs.”17 Although there may be some benefit to state-level 
competition in judgment enforcement,18 there are also significant 
transaction costs in dealing with fifty different state policies; these 
transaction costs may well outweigh any gains from competition and 
experimentation.19 
15. See Burbank, supra note 8, at 641 (stating that although the “Hague 
Service and Evidence Conventions were ratified as self-executing 
treaties,” Medellín makes it less likely that future conventions will follow 
suit, as the self-executing treaty is now “on the cutting edge of 
obsolescence in the United States”); see also Ronald A. Brand, Treaties 
and the Separation of Powers in the United States: A Reassessment 
After Medellín v. Texas, 47 DUQ. L. REV. 707, 727 (2009) (“This result 
is particularly likely in the areas of private international law and 
international private law, areas in which the United States is 
consistently involved in the negotiation of treaties and other 
international legal instruments at the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, UNCITRAL, and UNIDROIT.”). 
16. See James E. Pfander, Collateral Review of Remand Orders: 
Reasserting the Supervisory Role of the Supreme Court, 159 U. PA. L. 
REV. 493, 535 (2011) (“Interest groups may press for public 
expenditures, such as the repair of roads and bridges, but they are 
unlikely to press for jurisdictional repairs. The combined absence of 
interest group support and, dare I say it, intrinsic interest, can 
sometimes consign jurisdictional reform to legislative limbo.”). 
17. Brand, supra note 15, at 726–27. 
18. See Gregory Shill, Ending Judgment Arbitrage: Jurisdictional 
Competition and the Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments, 54 
HARV. INT’L L. J. (forthcoming 2013), at 75–76 (“[T]he diversity of state 
recognition law, which has persisted despite the availability of judgment 
arbitrage, suggests that declaring a uniform national rule would cut off 
an experiment in the 50 state laboratories before it may have run its 
course.”). 
19. See Linda J. Silberman & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, A Different Challenge 
for the ALI: Herein of Foreign Country Judgments, an International 
Treaty, and an American Statute, 75 IND. L.J. 635, 637 (2000) (“[A] 
438 
 
 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law·Vol. 45·2012 
The Politicization of Judgment Enforcement 
Making it more difficult to enter into international conventions on 
forum choice and judgment enforcement increases the chance that a 
more troubling aspect of domestic politics will come into play. At the 
current time, the domestic political landscape includes a significant 
xenophobic strain.20 As a result, state-level foreign policy choices are 
subject to political second-guessing.  
It is true that states may individually offer deference to 
international obligations; others have pointed out that “in the wake of 
some decisions by the [International Court of Justice] prior to the 
Avena/Medellín litigation, some governors commuted death sentences 
of individuals, perhaps in response to some of the pressure coming 
from these international tribunals.”21 However, it is likely no 
coincidence that the state which offered the greatest deference to the 
Avena decision—Oklahoma—is also the state where the voters 
adopted a constitutional amendment purporting to bar the use of 
international law altogether.22 As of 2012, the measure has been 
enjoined by federal courts and has not yet become effective.23 But as a 
reflection of state politics, the Oklahoma amendment raises significant 
concerns about state-level participation in foreign policy, court access, 
and transnational litigation, especially since over seventy percent of 
Oklahoma’s electorate voted in favor of the provision.24 Thus, even if 
the executive and judicial branches of the state are inclined to offer 
deference to international law—and they were in Oklahoma—there is 
no guarantee that a populist movement will not choose a different 
direction. Moreover, it is not clear that such state-by-state 
involvement is even necessary to protect state interests; as Professor 
uniform federal standard for those jurisdictional grounds that will be 
recognized for enforcement purposes would promote certainty and 
predictability.”). 
20. See Burbank, supra note 8, at 632 (“[H]aving poked its head out of 
international law and private international law cocoons on the field of 
civil litigation, the United States appears to be regressing to a posture of 
isolationism and xenophobia that is reminiscent of the second half of the 
nineteenth century.”). 
21. Peter B. Rutledge, Medellín, Delegation and Conflicts (of Law), 17 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 191, 225 (2009). 
22. See Cerna, supra note 2, at 459 (noting that the Oklahoma Court of 
Criminal Appeals reconsidered a death-penalty case in “a decision that 
would not have been possible but for the decision of the ICJ in Avena,” 
and that the Oklahoma governor ultimately commuted the death 
sentence); Awad v. Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1308 (W.D. Okla. 
2010). 
23. Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1132 (10th Cir. 2012). 
24. Tenth Circuit Upholds Injunction Barring Oklahoma Anti-Sharia, Anti-
International Law Constitutional Amendment, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 365, 
366 (2012). 
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John Quigley has pointed out, the ordinary treaty making process 
already integrates state concerns through the states’ representation in 
the Senate, thereby integrating state input without the risk of capture 
by xenophobic interests.25 
Of course, xenophobia is not going to prevail in every state. 
Nevertheless, overcoming such attitudes requires expending additional 
political capital—political capital that is in short supply in an 
increasingly partisan and polarized country.26 Voters in such states 
may be focused on the more immediately salient questions of death-
penalty policy or anti-terrorism initiatives; they are not likely to be 
thinking about transnational commercial litigation. Nevertheless, as 
Justice Breyer pointed out, state power in this area will have far-
reaching effects in matters of foreign relations by “plac[ing] the fate of 
an international promise made by the United States in the hands of a 
single State.”27 As a result, there is a significant risk that voters 
focused on crime and terrorism end up with a disproportionate 
influence in “the bread-and-butter commercial and other matters that 
are the typical subjects of self-executing treaty provisions.”28 
There is also a significant risk such partisan political distinctions 
will create enduring rifts. As international law becomes a more salient 
issue at the state level, loosely held xenophobic attitudes may solidify 
into an integral part of the way in which political movements self-
identify.29 And in fact, Medellín has become something of a political 
rallying cry for those who identify with the Tea Party, whose 
“supporters perceive that foreign forces are succeeding in taking over 
the United States, transforming the country they love into an 
unrecognizable and alien land” and whose “[r]hetoric of foreign 
25. John B. Quigley, A Tragi-Comedy of Errors Erodes Self-Execution of 
Treaties: Medellín v. Texas and Beyond, 45 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 
403 (2012). 
26. See Donna Leinwand, States Enter Debate on Sharia Law, USA TODAY, 
Dec. 9, 2010, at 3A. (“[L]egislators in at least seven states, including 
Arizona, Florida, Louisiana, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee and 
Utah, have proposed similar laws . . . . Tennessee and Louisiana have 
enacted versions of the law banning use of foreign law under certain 
circumstances.”). 
27. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 554 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
28. Id. at 554; but see Mark L. Movsesian, International Commercial 
Arbitration and International Courts, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 423, 
444 (2008) (noting that international arbitration is typically less 
controversial in part because of its focus on commercial matters). 
29. See, e.g., Cassandra Burke Robertson, Beyond the Torture Memos: 
Perceptual Filters, Cultural Commitments, and Partisan Identity, 42 
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 389, 399 (2009) (describing how support for 
torture became associated with partisan identification). 
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invasion and foreign infiltration dominates [its] speeches and 
literature.”30  
Even an international convention focused on litigation procedure 
can be re-framed as a partisan political issue. The Hague Convention 
on Choice of Courts Agreement, for example, “obligates the judicial 
branch of signatory nations generally to suspend litigation in favor of 
the country specified in a choice of courts clause and generally to 
enforce judgments rendered by that country,” and therefore would 
“bind a sovereign actor in some manner determined by reference to a 
rule or act of another entity not within the direct reach of the 
sovereign.”31 Finding the political will to ratify the convention might 
be easier said than done in the current political climate.32 
The development of international law is interactive, not static.33 
Medellín represents a noteworthy shift in the process of international 
lawmaking; it moves away from a traditional process and de-
emphasizes executive power at the federal level. In theory it allows 
greater legislative and state participation in the international realm. 
For private international law—and especially for matters of forum 
selection and judgment enforcement—this participation is likely to 
mean politicization. By leaving an opening for further politicization of 
international law, the Court’s opinion in Medellín moves the United 
States further away from being able to implement a coherent court-
access policy.  
 
30. Jared A. Goldstein, Can Popular Constitutionalism Survive the Tea 
Party Movement?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1807, 1815 (2011). 
31. Rutledge, supra note 21, at 197 (citing Hague Convention on Choice of 
Court Agreements art. 8, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294). 
32. See id. at 197; Burbank, supra note 8, at 639–41. 
33. Janet Koven Levit, Does Medellín Matter?, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 617, 
630 (2008) (referring to international law as “an interactive process”). 
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